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TEXT OF STATUTE 
Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part: 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime, 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of 
a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during 
cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death 
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he 
was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweights its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless 
of the punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not 
admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the 
date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the 
confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later 
date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that 
the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts 
and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicail effect. 
However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as 
calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to 
the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use 
such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity 
to contest the use of such evidence. 
iv. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Was Mr. Morehouse denied effective assistance of counsel 
where defense counsel advised him not to testify based on a 
misunderstanding of the Rules of Evidence? 
v. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JAMES MOREHOUSE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 860193-CA 
Priority No. 2 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is a Petition for Rehearing of a decision filed by 
this court on January 12, 1988. This case was appealed from a 
conviction for Aggravated Arson, a second degree felony, in the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to the facts set forth in the slip opinion at 
page 1 and the top of page 2, the following facts are pertinent: 
Mr. Morehouse had informed defense counsel that he wished 
to testify and that he could explain his whereabouts during a 
critical half hour period prior to the first fire (Vol. 7, 36). The 
prosecutor believed that Mr. Morehouse's whereabouts during the half 
hour prior to the first fire were critical to the case, and during 
closing argument referred to that half hour period as crucial at 
least three times (T. Vol. 6, p. 12, 13 14) and an additional time 
in rebuttal (T. Vol. 6, 62-63). The prosecutor also pointed out 
twice in closing and once in rebuttal argument that there was no 
evidence indicating Mr. Morehouse's whereabouts during this half 
hour period (T. Vol. 6, P. 13, 14, 63) and suggested that Morehouse 
set the first fire during that time period, then drove to Sandy 
(T. Vol. 6, p. 14). 
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, defense 
counsel testified that the time period prior to the first fire where 
Mr. Morehouse's whereabouts were unaccounted for was critical to the 
case. Defense counsel testified further at the hearing on the 
motion that he misunderstood Utah Rules of Evidence 609 and that 
based on that misunderstanding, he advised Mr. Morehouse not to 
testify because Mr. Morehouse would be required "to respond not only 
as to the fact of his prior convictions, but as to the number and 
nature" making it impossible "to make Mr. Morehouse presentable to 
the jury." Dissenting opinion J. Jackson, slip opinion at 7. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The majority opinion in State v. Morehouse, No. 
860193-CA, slip op. (Utah App. January 12, 1988) misconstrued and 
misapprehended the facts and law in finding that Mr. Morehouse's 
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was not 
violated where counsel, based on a misunderstanding of the rules of 
evidence, advised Mr. Morehouse not to testify without moving to 
suppress Mr. Morehouse's prior convictions. The assumptions of the 
majority that (1) the focus of the prosecution was on the first 
fire; (2) had Mr. Morehouse testified, inconsistencies would have 
been further developed; and (3) had Mr. Morehouse testified, the 
jury would have been informed that Mr. Morehouse had been convicted 
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of a felony are faulty. Furthermore, it is critical to the majority 
opinion that the opinion clarify which conviction(s) under which 
subsection of Utah R. Evidence 609 would have been admitted. 
Finally, the Court's conclusion that trial counsel's advice was 
based on legitimate trial tactics does not reflect the facts in this 
case. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
This petition for rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35, 
Utah Rules of Court of Appeals. In Brown v. Pickard, denying reh'g, 
11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established the 
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating: 
To justify a rehearing, a strong case be made. We 
must be convinced that the court failed to consider 
some material point in the case, or that it erred in 
its conclusions. 
. • . 
11 P. at 512. Later, in Cummings v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (1913) this 
Court added: 
To make an application for a rehearing is a matter 
of right, and we have no desire to discourage the 
practice of filing petitions for rehearings in 
proper cases. When this court, however, has 
considered and decided all of the material questions 
involved in a case, a rehearing should not be 
applied for, unless we have misconstrued or 
overlooked some statute or decision which may affect 
the result, or that we have based the decision on 
some wrong principle of law, or have either 
misapplied or overlooked something which materially 
affects the result. . . . If there are some 
reasons, however, such as we have indicated above, 
or other good reasons, a petition for a rehearing 
should be promptly filed and, if it is meritorious, 
its form will in no case be scrutinized by this 
court. 
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Cummings v. Nielson at 624. The argument section of this brief will 
establish that, applying these standards, this petition for 
rehearing is properly before the Court and should be granted. In 
its opinion in State v. Morehouse, No. 860193-CA, slip op. (Utah 
App. Jan. 12, 1988) (attached as Appendix A) this Court 
misapprehended and misconstrued the facts and law. 
POINT: MR. MOREHOUSE WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHERE DEFENSE 
COUNSEL MISUNDERSTOOD UTAH R. EVID. 609 AND, AS A 
RESULT, DID NOT CALL MR. MOREHOUSE TO TESTIFY. 
In the majority opinion in the present case, after a 
brief paragraph discussing the claim of ineffectiveness based on 
trial counsel's misunderstanding of the Rules of Evidence, the 
majority concludes: 
It is difficult to see how the defendant's failure 
to testify leads to a reasonable probability that 
the result would have been different. Again, 
counsel's decision falls within the wide latitude of 
legitimate trial tactics. 
These two sentences suggest that the majority believes that neither 
prong of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984) and its progeny was met i.e. 
that counsel's performance was neither deficient nor prejudicial to 
Mr. Morehouse's case. 
In reaching such a conclusion, the Court relies on three 
premises, each of which is faulty: (1) that the focus of the 
prosecution was on the second fire so the defendant's explanation of 
his whereabouts prior to the first fire was unimportant; (2) had Mr. 
Morehouse testified, inconsistencies in statements made by various 
witnesses and statements made to Mr. Morehouse "would have been 
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further developed" Morehouse, slip op. at 5; and (3) the jury would 
have been informed that Mr. Morehouse had been convicted of a 
felony. Morehouse, Slip op. at 3. 
The prosecutor in this case believed that the critical or 
crucial issue was the whereabouts of Mr. Morehouse during a period 
of approximately one half hour prior to the first fire. In closing 
argument the prosecutor stated: 
"The key time being where was the defendant between 
7:30 and 8:00, because we know the fire department 
is called a little after 8:00. 7:30 to 8:00 then 
becomes the crucial period of time." 
T. Vol. 6, p. 12. 
He later stated: 
"But the crucial time is where was he between 7:30 
and 8:00? There is no evidence in this case that 
indicates where he was except his statement to Mr. 
Regan, he was home about an hour." 
T. Vol. 6, p. 13. 
The prosecutor also stated: 
"The second fire, of course, the fire department 
leaves at 10:00 and they are called back at 11:05. 
These times, I think, are significant in the case 
because the real issue is, where was the defendant 
between 7:30 and 8:00. 
T. Vol. 6, T. 14. 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor stated: 
"The key time of the first fire is 7:30 to 8:00. 
There is no one that can account for the defendant's 
whereabouts between 7:30 and 8:00. That is where I 
think it is significant." 
During the hearing on the motion for new trial, defense counsel 
testified: 
"The alibi witnesses only filled a small time frame 
that needed to be filled. What was most critical 
was the one hour of time preceding the first fire. 
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The alibi witnesses could not place Mr. Morehouse in 
their presence an hour before the fire, and Mr. 
Jones argued very forcibly, I believe to the jury 
that that very time frame was sufficient upon which 
to convict Mr. Morehouse. 
T. Vol. 7, p. 26. 
In this case, a critical aspect of the state's theory was that Mr. 
Morehouse set the first fire and that he did so during the half hour 
period in question prior to the first fire. The state repeatedly 
stressed that this half hour period was crucial or critical and 
buttressed its argument by pointing out that no evidence as to Mr. 
Morehouse's actions or whereabouts during that period had been 
presented. Under such circumstances, where both counsel at trial 
believed the period prior to the first fire was critical, where the 
state repeatedly stressed the nonexistence of evidence about such 
period to support its theory and where Mr. Morehouse would have 
presented evidence about such period had he testified, the failure 
of Mr. Morehouse to testify prejudiced his case. The majority's 
statement that "(t)he focus of the prosecution, however, was on the 
second fire" (Morehouse, slip op. at 4) is not based on the facts 
and second guesses the determination of the prosecutor, who worked 
closely with the case and developed it for trial, that the half hour 
period prior to the first fire was critical to the case. 
Furthermore, as the dissent points out, had Mr. Morehouse 
testified, he would have been in a position to explain his reason 
for sitting in a car at the gas station, in plain view of the 
neighbors and all others on a busy street, until minutes before the 
second alarm was called in "as well as what went on inside the 
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building when he entered it." Morehouse/ slip op. at 11. Hence, 
not only was his testimony regarding the time gap prior to the first 
fire critical, but his testimony regarding his actions prior to the 
second fire was also of importance. 
In its majority opinion, the Court also states that had 
Mr. Morehouse testified, the inconsistencies in statements would 
have been further developed, therefore suggesting that Mr. 
Morehouse's testimony would have only hurt his case. On the 
contrary, as defense counsel testified, such testimony would have 
clarified those inconsistencies and offered the jury a succinct 
picture of Mr. Morehouse's whereabouts and actions on the night in 
question (T. Vol. 7, p. 36; Morehouse, slip op. at 11 (Jackson, J. 
dissenting) Speculation that Mr. Morehouse's testimony would have 
heightened the inconsistencies in statements is not grounded in the 
record, in addition, presenting Mr. Morehouse to the jury would 
have erased any questions the jurors might have as to why he was not 
testifying, and humanized Mr. Morehouse to the jury. 
Finally, the Court bases its conclusion on the fact that 
"(t)he jury would have been told, at the very least, that he had 
previously been convicted of a felony" Morehouse, slip op. at 5. 
The Court does not discuss the basis for such a statement, and in 
footnote 2, passes over the argument raised in this appeal as to 
whether such convictions would have been admissible for impeachment 
purposes by simply stating that Mr. Morehouse has a long record with 
several felony convictions and that Utah R. Evid. 609 would permit 
the use of those prior convictions to impeach credibility had Mr. 
Morehouse testified. 
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However, as Mr. Morehouse pointed out in his reply brief 
and the dissent notes, there exists considerable question as to 
whether Mr. Morehouse's prior convictions would have been 
admissible. Mr. Morehouse's convictions were: 
1964 Burglary 
1972 Possession of Weapon by Restricted Person 
1973 Burglary and Theft 
1976 Possession of a Controlled Substance 
1982 Driving Under the Influence 
As the dissent notes, the DUI conviction was not admissible pursuant 
to Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1) and the 1964 and 1972 convictions were 
more than ten years old and therefore of minimal probative value. 
Furthermore, the state did not provide written notice of its intent 
to rely on such remote convictions, as required by Utah R. Evid 
609(b)(1983) . See also State v. Gentry, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 23 
(1987). Coupling the age of those convictions with their minimal 
relevance in determining credibility, and contrasting that with the 
prejudicial effect given the nature of the convictions, it is 
unlikely that either the 1973 or 1964 conviction would have been 
admitted. (See State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986) and State 
v. Gentry.) 
A split in opinion among federal circuits currently 
exists as to whether burglary and theft are crimes of dishonesty 
under Rule 609(a)(2) or subject only to the balancing test of Rule 
609(a)(1). As briefed by Mr. Morehouse in his reply brief at 3-6 
and 10-12, and noted by the dissent in footnote 2 of the slip 
opinion at 9, the better reasoned decisions hold that burglary and 
theft not arising from fraudulent conduct are not crimes of 
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dishonesty or false statement and therefore Rule 609(a)(2) would not 
be applicable to the 1973 conviction for Burglary. This issue is 
currently on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Bruce, 
Case No. 860325, and is pertinent to the present case since, if 
609(a)(1) rather than 609(a)(2) is applicable to the 1973 Burglary 
and Theft conviction, it is unlikely that the 1973 conviction would 
be admissible. Pursuant to the balancing test set forth in State v. 
Banner, at 1334 and State v. Gentry, at 22-3, (1) the crime has 
little bearing on veracity, (2) it is very old, (3) because an entry 
of a building was involved in the present case, the similarity might 
lead the jury to punish the accused as a bad person, (4) credibility 
of the defendant was critical in this case comprised solely of 
circumstantial evidence and (5) the importance of Mr. Morehouse's 
testimony in this case to fill in the time gap prior to the first 
fire and otherwise explain inconsistent testimony warrants the 
exclusion of convictions. Under this Banner analysis and pursuant 
to the concerns set forth in State v. Gentry, it is doubtful that 
the state could have sustained its burden under Rule 609(a) of 
establishing the probative value of the 1973 conviction for Burglary 
and Theft outweighed its prejudicial effect, thereby making it 
admissible. See State v. Gentry at 22. 
The remaining conviction in 1976 for possession of 
controlled substances likely would be excluded under a similar 
analysis. See Reply Brief at 7-8; State v. Gentry. 
In light of the unresolved issue as to whether Utah R. 
Evid. 609(a)(2) is applicable to Burglary and Theft crimes, the 
remoteness and minimal relevance of the other crimes and the 
-9-
concerns addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Gentry, it 
is important to this decision that Mr. Morehouse be informed as to 
which felony convictions the Court believes would have been admitted. 
The Court also seems to suggest in relying on the fact 
that "(t)he jury would have been told, at the very least, that he 
had previously been convicted of a felony "to support its conclusion 
that a jury who heard that Mr. Morehouse was a convicted felon 
simply would not believe his version of events. Such an assumption 
points out precisely why, in balancing under Rule 609(a)(1), certain 
convictions should not be admitted; the concern that jurors will 
punish an accused because he is a bad person rather than because he 
committed the particular crime and was not credible in the instance 
in question arises repeatedly in Utah law (See State v. Pacheco, 712 
P.2d 192 (Utah 1985); State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985); 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(1983) . This statement in the majority opinion 
seems to suggest that had the jury known Mr. Morehouse was convicted 
of any felony at any time in his life, it would have convicted him 
in this instance for being a bad person. However, felonies are 
admissible under 609(a)(1) only for the purpose of impeaching 
credibility. If the majority believes the conviction for Possession 
of Controlled Substances was the felony which would have been 
admitted, such felony has little to do with credibility and it 
cannot be said that a jury informed of such conviction would 
necessarily disbelieve Mr. Morehouse. 
Where prior convictions are admitted under Rule 609 to 
impeach credibility, the jury is generally instructed that the prior 
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conviction is to be considered only in deciding the person's 
credibility and not for determining whether the defendant is a "bad 
person" who acted in conformity with prior activities in committing 
the crime in question. 
in addition, where a defendant fails to testify, juries 
often consider that defendant a "bad person" and wonder what the 
defendant is hiding. Had counsel made a motion to suppress, and, in 
the event the court allowed a conviction in, testified on direct to 
that conviction coupled with a statement that he was not required to 
testify, the jury may well have believed Mr. Morehouse was "coming 
clean" with them and found him credible. Hence, a conclusion that 
the jury would have convicted Mr. Morehouse had it been informed of 
any prior felony conviction is erroneous. 
A clear statement as to which prior felony (or felonies) 
would have been admitted is important to the majority's decision: 
(1) to clarify whether Utah R. Evidence 609(a)(2) is applicable to 
crimes of burglary and theft; (2) to clarify whether the Court 
believes the state sustained its burden of proving that the 
probative value of certain convictions outweighed their prejudicial 
effect under Rule 609(a)(1); and (3) to clarify whether a jury 
presented with evidence of the prior felony would be likely to 
convict Mr. Morehouse. 
In its opinion, the Court does not address Mr. 
Morehouse's argument that, in addition to the actual prejudice 
established in this case, the right of a defendant to testify is so 
fundamental that the failure to testify in and of itself is 
prejudicial to a defendant's case. Mr. Morehouse cited United 
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States v. Butts, 630 F. Supp. 1145 (D.Me. 1986) for the proposition 
that prejudice can be presumed where counsel incompetency prevents a 
criminal defendant from testifying. While the dissent distinguished 
the Butts case, it embraced other cases emphasizing the importance 
of a defendant's right to testify. See Morehouse, slip op. at 12 
(Jackson, J. dissenting) citing Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071 
(5th Cir. 1978) (Godhold, J. dissenting) cert, denied 439 U.S. 1004 
(1978); United States v. Walker, 772 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1985). 
Furthermore, a close reading of Strickland and its 
progeny suggests that the weaker the evidence in a given case, the 
more likely that the outcome will be affected by the counsel's 
error. The Strickland Court stated: "a verdict or conclusion only 
weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected 
by errors than one with overwhelming record support." 466 U.S. 668, 
696. As Mr. Morehouse argued in Appellant's opening brief at 6-12 
and as the dissent acknowledges, "the evidence in this case . . . 
was meager" Morehouse, slip op. at 11 (Jackson, J. dissenting). The 
paucity of evidence in this case coupled with the importance of the 
one-half hour time gap prior to the first fire, as repeatedly 
emphasized by the state in its closing argument, and Mr. Morehouse's 
ability to explain his whereabouts during that period as well as 
inconsistencies in testimony, in addition to the fundamental 
importance of a defendant's right to testify in any case, establish 
that Mr. Morehouse was prejudiced by counsel's error in advising him 
not to testify. 
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The statement in the majority opinion that: "Again, 
counsel's decision falls within the wide latitude of legitimate 
trial tactics." (Morehouse, slip op. at 5) misconstrues the evidence 
in the present case. Defense counsel testified that the decision 
was not based on tactics, but on a misunderstanding of the 
applicable Rule of Evidence, even though it had been in effect three 
years (Morehouse slip op. at 7) (Jackson, J. dissenting). As the 
dissent points out: "reasonably competent defense counsel would 
have sought to restrict the prosecutor's use of Morehouse's 
convictions at a pretrial hearing conducted in accordance with Rule 
609. . ." Morehouse, slip op. at 10 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
Defense counsel acknowledged his deficient performance and outlined 
his erroneous advice under oath. Under such circumstances, this 
Court misconstrued the facts in stating that the decision was based 
on legitimate trial tactics. 
Counsel's advice to Mr. Morehouse that he not testify was 
the result of deficient performance and not a tactical decision. As 
a result of such erroneous advice, Mr. Morehouse was not able to 
tell the jury his side of the story and to fill in critical missing 
information. Mr. Morehouse respectfully requests that this Court 
reconsider its decision and find that his right to effective 
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution was violated. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Morehouse 
respectfully requests that this Petition for Rehearing be granted. 
Counsel for Mr. Morehouse certifies that this petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
State of Utah, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) OPINION 
) (For Publication) 
v. ) 
) Case No. 860193-CA 
James Ace Morehouse, ) 
§ !L» tZ LJ 
JAN 121988 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench and Davidson. 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Defendant appeals his conviction of aggravated arson on the 
grounds of insufficiency of evidence and insufficiency of 
counsel. We affirm. 
On November 1, 1985, defendant was the lessee and operator 
of a gas service station located at 400 E. 1300 S. in Salt Lake 
City. At approximately 8:00 p.m. firemen were called to 
extinguish a fire in the ceiling over the office in that 
building. The fire was extinguished with little real damage 
although the ceiling was pulled down to put out any hot spots. 
The preliminary cause of the fire was stated to be electrical 
since a light fixture was located in the area where the fire 
began. No investigator was called and upon the arrival of 
defendant the fire department crew left the station in his care. 
At approximately 11:00 p.m. the fire department was again 
called to the scene to fight another fire, this one in the 
office and service bay. The commander on the scene, Lt. 
Mauerman, saw that this fire had multiple origins and rather 
than being suppressed by water, was being spread as though the 
fire was being pushed around by the spray. He immediately 
suspected arson and called an investigator. The investigator, 
Captain Memmot, arrived on the scene very quickly. He began an 
investigation and concluded that the fire was arson caused. In 
the course of the investigation that night, he took two rolls 
of slides and picked up numerous items of evidence for 
preservation and analysis. Captain Memmot was assisted by a 
police arson investigator, Detective Clegg, who questioned 
several witnesses including defendant. The following day and 
again several days later Captain Memmot returned to the station 
where he did further investigation and took additional slides. 
Several months after the fires, defendant was charged with 
the crime of aggravated arson. He was tried before a jury, 
convicted and sentenced to prison. This appeal followed. 
Defendant first claims the evidence was insufficient to 
show arson. The standard of review to be applied to a criminal 
jury verdict is well established. The Utah Supreme Court in 
the case of State v. Underwood. 737 P.2d 995 (Utah 1987), 
outlined the standard. 
In reviewing a defendant's conviction, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury. 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses. Id. 
When there is any evidence, including reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from it, from which 
findings of all the requisite elements of the 
crime can be reasonably made, our inquiry stops 
and we sustain the verdict. 
737 P.2d at 996. 
The jury was shown evidence which strongly supported the 
conclusion that both fires were intentionally set. Lieutenant 
Mauerman testified that the second fire exhibited 
characteristics of being caused by a flammable liquid. Also 
concerning the second fire, Captain Memmot testified of 
multiple points of origin, of pour patterns, burn patterns and 
damage characteristic of a flammable liquid being poured and 
then ignited. He testified that evidence taken from the fire 
scene showed the presence of gasoline. He ruled out the 
possibility of an electrical fire testifying to his examination 
of the wiring, junction box and circuit breaker box. He 
exhibited numerous slides to illustrate his findings and to 
show why he made his conclusions. While concluding that both 
fires were intentionally caused, he found no connection between 
the two. 
The jury had before it adequate evidence to conclude that 
the fires were intentionally caused. We will not disturb their 
findings. 
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The defendant next claims the evidence was insufficient to 
show that he was responsible for either fire. As is the case 
in most arson investigations, the evidence was largely 
circumstantial. However, in this case the jury heard from a 
neighbor who stated she knew defendant and had done business 
with him. She testified that at 11:00 p.m. on the night of the 
fires she watched defendant enter the station through a hole in 
the door left from the first fire. Immediately after he 
entered, the witness heard the sound of breaking glass and saw 
flames shoot up in the office area. Defendant then came back 
out and entered his automobile. 
The jury heard testimony from other witnesses that 
supported the eyewitness and controverted defendant's version 
of the facts as given through the testimony of his wife. 
Testimony was also given as to a possible financial motive for 
the defendant to start the fires. We cannot say, from the 
evidence presented to the jury, that the evidence Mis 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d at 345 (quoting State v. Petree, 659 
P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
We next turn to the argument that defendant was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel. In the recent case of State v. 
Archuleta, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (19.87), the Supreme Court 
re-emphasized the requirements necessary to prove ineffective 
assistance of counsel as follows: 
In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, an appellant must show 
(first) that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the "counsel" 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 
that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense. This requires showing that 
counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a 
trial whose result is reliable. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 
reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984). 
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Before this Court will consider whether 
specific conduct falls below the required 
standard of objective reasonableness, the 
person arguing ineffective assistance must 
show that the conduct prejudiced his case. 
Id. at 697; see also State v. Frame, 723 
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). In order to 
prove prejudice to his case, "defendant 
must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.H Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
69 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16-17. 
Defendant raises two specific omissions which he claims 
are prejudicial. First is the failure of counsel to object to 
evidence seized in warrantless searches. No objection was 
raised to any of the evidence and defense counsel made use of 
it during cross examination of prosecution witnesses. Later 
the defense called an expert witness to testify that the fires 
were electrically caused. This expert based his analysis and 
conclusion on the same evidence. Had the jury chosen to 
believe him, the element of intentional burning could not have 
been proven and defendant could not have been found guilty. We 
find no prejudice in the failure to object to the evidence. 
This clearly falls within legitimate trial tactics of defense 
counsel. State v. Pursifell, 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Ct. App. 
1987); Lavton Citv v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Utah App. 
1987); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1110 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant next argues that because defense counsel did not 
understand a rule of evidence, he was prevented from testifying 
in his own behalf. Defendant claims he could explain his 
whereabouts prior to the first fire. The focus of the 
prosecution, however, was on the second fire. During the 
trial, several witnesses testified as to movements, whereabouts 
and statements made by defendant.1 Had defendant testified 
1. Several statements made by defendant were admitted through 
other witnesses. His wife was also allowed to testify. Several 
conflicts were obvious between defendant's statements and the 
testimony of his wife. At one point defendant claimed the fire 
was started by someone from a mysterious car. This was 
supported by testimony from his wife. In a later statement 
defendant told the investigator that the occupants of that car 
were not HsuspectsM in the fire. 
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he would have been subject to cross examination on all this 
evidence. Inconsistencies in statements would have been further 
developed. The jury would have been told, at the very least, 
that he had previously been convicted of a felony.2 It is 
difficult to see how the defendant's failure to testify leads to 
a reasonable probability that the result would have been 
different. Again, counsel's decision falls within the wide 
latitude of legitimate trial tactics. 
We find no merit in defendant's arguments raised on 
appeal. Accordingly the judgment and sentence are affirmed. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
JACKSON, Judge (dissenting): 
I respectfully dissent. 
On appeal, Morehouse claims he was denied his right, under 
the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, to 
effective assistance of counsel at trial because of each of the 
following two instances of alleged incompetency .by his retained 
counsel: (1) counsel kept Morehouse from testifying in his own 
behalf based on counsel's erroneous belief that the rules of 
2. Defendant has a long criminal record involving convictions 
for several felonies and two prior incarcerations in the Utah 
State Prison. Pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 609 evidence of prior 
criminal convictions may be elicited from the witness to attack 
his credibility. By not testifying defendant prevented any 
mention of his past criminal activity from reaching the jury. 
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evidence would allow the defendant to be impeached on 
cross-examination by the introduction of all his previous 
criminal convictions; and (2) counsel failed, both before and 
during trial, to seek exclusion of evidence seized in 
warrantless searches of the gas station after the night of the 
fires, as well as the expert opinion testimony based thereon, 
I do not address the second alleged error by counsel, although 
it adds fuel to the issue of prejudice, because the first is 
constitutionally dispositive. 
In order to succeed in his claim, Morehouse must 
demonstrate that his trial counsel's specific act or omission 
fell below an objective standard of professional reasonableness 
and that the deficiencies in representation resulted in 
prejudice to him. State v. Archuleta, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16 
(1987); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (adopting 
the two part standard for ineffective assistance of counsel 
enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). 
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION 
With regard to the first claimed error by appellant's 
counsel, there is no question that Morehouse has met the first 
part of the Strickland test by showing a specific action that 
falls outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. See State v. Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. At their 
first consultation, Morehouse told the attorney that he wanted 
to testify in his own behalf. He had alibi witnesses1 for 
the entire evening of November 1, except for the thirty minutes 
just prior to the first fire report. He had been in a public 
place with friends for an extended period of time and was home 
with his wife within one-half hour, where another witness 
phoned him. Only he could tell the jury where he was and what 
he was doing at the time the initial fire started. Only he 
could explain what he observed and what he did inside the 
building prior to the second fire. Before entering, he and his 
wife had been sitting in their car in front of the gas station 
for a long period, in full view of everyone, including his 
neighbor-customer (later key prosecution witness) across the 
street. Only he could share with the jury a first-person 
account of his claims of innocence. 
1. Although the alibi defense was pursued through Morehouse's 
other witnesses (without objection from the prosecution), trial 
counsel apparently did not file and serve a written notice of 
intention to claim alibi, as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-14-2 (1982). 
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But his attorney deprived him of his constitutional right to 
testify. Counsel erroneously advised him not to testify because 
he could be cross-examined concerning all his numerous prior 
convictions/ thereby keeping Morehouse off the witness stand and 
prohibiting his testimony. 
After Morehouse's conviction and sentencing on April 14, 
1986/ counsel filed a motion for a new trial. At the hearing on 
that motion/ counsel admitted his legal error in misunderstanding 
the applicable rule of evidence/ Utah R. Evid. 609, and its effect 
on Morehouse. He testified that he did not call Morehouse to the 
stand solely because of the defendant's prior convictions/ and 
that he had advised Morehouse that/ if he took the stand, he would 
be required Mto respond not only as to the fact of his prior 
convictions/ but as to the number and nature,H making it 
impossible "to make Morehouse presentable to the jury." Counsel 
claimed that he subsequently realized his error in not filing a 
pretrial motion to restrict the use of Morehouse's convictions for 
impeachment purposes when he read the opinion of the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1985), issued the 
day of Morehouse's sentencing. 
Counsel would not proceed on those adverse admissions as an 
appeal tactic if they were not true. He considered his erroneous 
advice to be of serious proportions and prejudicial. He was the 
only person, other than Morehouse# who knew the full story. 
However/ my colleagues/ without the benefit of any greater 
knowledge/ deem the matter harmless. I do not. 
Appellant's attorney failed to know and understand Utah R. 
Evid. 609/ even though it was adopted on April 14 , 1983/ three 
years before Morehouse's trial/ and became effective September 1, 
1983. It is true that the rule, when adopted/ conflicted with the 
last sentence of Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-9 (1987), allowing a 
witness to be cross-examined on any previous felony conviction. 
But/ even though Banner was the first Utah case to explicitly 
declare that portion of the statute superseded by Utah R. Evid. 
609/ the Preliminary Note to the 1983 Utah Rules of Evidence 
declared that any existing statute inconsistent with the rules was 
impliedly repealed with their adoption and that the new rules 
provided a fresh starting place for the law of evidence in this 
state. The pertinent subsections of Rule 609 state: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness/ 
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime 
shall be admitted if elicited from him or 
established by public record during 
cross-examination but only if the crime 
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(1) was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under 
the law under which he was convicted, and 
the court determines that the probative 
value of admitting this evidence outweighs 
its prejudicial effect to the defendant, 
or (2) involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a 
conviction under this rule is not 
admissible if a period of more than ten 
years has elapsed since the date of the 
conviction or of the release of the 
witness from the confinement imposed for 
that conviction, whichever is the later 
date, unless the court determines, in the 
interests of justice, that the probative 
value of the conviction supported by 
specific facts and circumstances 
substantially outweighs its prejudicial 
effect. However, evidence of a conviction 
more than ten years old as calculated 
herein, is not admissible unless the 
proponent gives to the adverse party 
sufficient advance written notice of 
intent to use such evidence to provide the 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to 
contest the use of such evidence. 
Morehouse's prior convictions were: 
1964 Burglary 
1972 Possession of a weapon by a restricted person 
1973 Burglary and theft 
1976 Possession of a controlled substance 
1982 Driving under the influence 
Under subsection (a)(1) of Rule 609, the DUI conviction was not 
admissible because not punishable by more than one year's 
imprisonment. The 19 64 and 1972 convictions, being more than 
ten years old, were inadmissible under subsection (b) unless 
the court determined that their probative value outweighed 
their prejudicial effect, an unlikely result given the nature 
of the convictions and the fact that they occurred 22 and 14 
years, respectively, before Morehouse's trial for aggravated 
arson. The 1973 conviction was potentially admissible under 
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subsection (a), because Morehouse had been reimprisoned for 
that offense and not released until 1978, less than ten years 
before this trial.2 See Utah R. Evid. 609(b). But both that 
2. Contrary to the view expressed by the trial judge at the 
hearing on the motion for new trial, appellant's 1973 conviction 
for burglary was not admissible under subsection (a)(2) as 
involving "dishonesty or false statement," i.e., without the 
determination required by subsection (a)(1). In order to 
interpret that phrase in our rule, Utah courts must look to the 
federal decisions interpreting Fed. Rule Evid. 609(a)(2), State 
v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah 1986), recognizing that the 
federal courts are not in full agreement on what constitutes 
"dishonesty or false statement" under their rule. See 
Annotation, Impeachment of Witness bv Evidence of Prior 
Conviction, 39 A.L.R. Fed. 570, 596 (1976). I find more 
persuasive and better-reasoned those decisions holding that 
burglary and theft not arising from fraudulent conduct are not 
crimes involving "dishonesty or false statement" within the 
meaning of Rule 609(a)(2). 
By the phrase "dishonesty and false 
statement" the Conference means crimes 
such as perjury or subornation of perjury, 
false statement, criminal fraud, 
embezzlement, or false pretense, or any 
other offense in the nature of crimen 
falsi, the commission of which involves 
some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or 
falsification bearing on the accused's 
propensity to testify truthfully. 
United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1976), 
(quoting H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 
reprinted in 1974 U. S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 7098, 
7103). The rule's intent was to limit introduction of prior 
convictions for impeachment purposes only to those crimes that 
bear directly on a witness's propensity not to tell the truth. 
Otherwise, one could argue that any crime could be introduced to 
impeach. See United States v. Millings, 535 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976). Burglary and ordinary theft are not crimes of 
dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2) 
because they do not involve the credibility-deteriorating quality 
contemplated in the rule. See United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 
1269 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Entrekin, 624 F.2d 597 (5th 
Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981); United States v. 
Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1978). 
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conviction and the 1976 possession conviction were admisssible 
viaRule 609(a)(1) only after the trial court determined that 
their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect.3 
State v. Gentry, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 22 (1987). 
In short/ reasonably competent defense counsel would have 
sought to restrict the prosecutor's use of Morehouse's 
convictions at a pre-trial hearing conducted in accordance with 
Rule 609/ at which it would have been the prosecution's burden to 
persuade the court that their probative value outweighed their 
prejudicial effect. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334. 
Furthermore/ reasonably competent defense counsel would have 
known the content of Utah R. Evid. 609 and its applicability to 
appellant's circumstances and would have been able to give 
Morehouse correct legal advice about the rule's impact on his 
right to testify in his own defense. 
PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT 
Having determined that trial counsel's representation of 
Morehouse was demonstrably incompetent/ the next question is 
whether that deficiency was prejudicial to appellant.4 
3. The factors that should be considered by the trial court in 
balancing probative value against prejudicial effect for purposes 
of Utah R. Evid. 609 are enumerated in State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 
at 1334. 
4. I note that at least one federal district court has declined 
to apply this second part of the Strickland test where trial 
counsel's incompetency kept a criminal defendant from testifying 
in his own behalf. 
This Court considers a defendant's right to 
testify in a criminal proceeding against him so 
basic to a fair trial that its infraction can 
never be treated as harmless error/ which is in 
essence the inquiry required to be made by the 
second/ prejudice to the defendant/ prong of 
Strickland. 
United States v. Butts, 630 F. Supp. 1145/ 1148 (D. Me. 1986). 
Although/ as here, the issue as presented to the court was the 
denial of a sixth amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel/ the Butts court instead recognized a due process right 
of the defendant to testify in his own behalf because counsel's 
actions had "affected the very fairness of the trial process 
itself." Id.. Defendant's motion for a new trial was granted. 
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State v. Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. In order to substantiate a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show 
that a "reasonable probability" exists that, but for counsel's 
error, the outcome of the trial would have been different, A 
"reasonable probability" is one sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the reliability of the verdict. Id.; State v. 
Lairbv, 699 P.2d 1187, 1204-06 (Utah 1984). See Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 491. 
The evidence in this case, although legally sufficient to 
support a conviction, was meager. There was no affirmative 
evidence that Morehouse caused the first fire; moreover, his 
behavior the remainder of the night appears inconsistent with 
that of the second fire's instigator. The purported 
motive—that Morehouse wanted to burn himself out of his 
business lease—is highly suspect. 
Testimony by Morehouse to explain the half-hour gap in his 
alibi was crucial to his case, especially since the 
prosecutor's argument focused the jury on the gap. As 
previously stated, only he could explain to the jury why he was 
sitting in a car at the gas station, in plain view of the 
neighbors and all others on the busy street, until minutes 
before the second alarm was called in. Only he could tell what 
went on inside the building when he entered it. 
Morehouse's trial counsel considered that testimony 
consequential enough to raise a "reasonable probability" of a 
different outcome. Otherwise, trial counsel would not have 
filed the highly embarrassing post-trial motion for a new trial. 
(footnote 4 continued) 
with the court holding that, where ineffective assistance of 
counsel deprives a defendant of his right to testify, prejudice 
is sufficiently proven from that deprivation. However 
sympathetic I may be to this analysis, this court is constrained 
to apply both parts of the Strickland test to the case before 
us, in light of the conclusion in State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at 
1335, that the trial court's error in not excluding use of 
defendant's convictions for impeachment purposes—which kept 
defendant from testifying in his own behalf—"does not reach 
constitutional proportion." 
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The jury was deprived of the benefit of both hearing and 
observing this critical witness. It was not for his attorney 
to muzzle him in this manner. Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 
1071, 1078 (5th Cir. 1978) (Godbold, J., dissenting), cert. 
denied/ 439 U.S. 1004 (1978). -Where the very point of a trial 
is to determine whether an individual was involved in criminal 
activity, the testimony of the individual himself must be 
considered of prime importance.H United States v. Walker, 772 
F.2d 1172, 1179 (5th Cir. 1985). Plainly, Morehouse's 
testimony had exculpatory potential and would have enhanced his 
defense. Jji. (quoting United States v. Larson, 596 F.2d 759, 
779 (8th Cir. 1979)). 
After a careful review of the testimony and evidence 
presented at trial, I am compelled to conclude that there is a 
reasonable probability that the jury verdict would have been 
different if counsel had competently understood the rules of 
evidence and not kept Morehouse from testifying. Therefore, 
defendant's conviction ought to be reversed and the case 
remanded for a new trial. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
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